William Empson, in his analysis of seven types of ambiguity, has written about the omnipresence and power of ambiguity in literature (3) . If ambiguity is central to literature, one particular instance of ambiguity motivating this editorial appears in Empson's definition of one of the basic functions of literature -namely, "The central function of imaginative literature is to make you realize that other people act on moral convictions different from your own" (4) .
This ambiguity involving differences, even contradictions, between the moral convictions upon which we build our responses to, and actions about, the most important questions of human living, may for many of us fall as a shadow, as a distressing darkness, between our desires for unity and harmony and the realities of ethical incompatibilities and resultant tensions that separate us from one another. If only, we may want to think, all of these differences and contradictions could be reduced to one correct way of seeing, thinking, and acting, at least regarding the things of highest importance in human life.
Yet, ambiguity casts not only a shadow but also sheds a light upon why such a simplistic reduction of differences, contradictions, and tensions into a desired unity and harmony will always remain illusory. The scientists Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers have seen through this illusion with their statement "The irreducible plurality of perspectives on the same reality expresses the impossibility of a divine point of view from which the whole of reality is visible" (5) .
If ambiguity is omnipresent in literature, and for many is highly disturbing in matters of morality, it is also essential to creativity in mathematics. In his discussion of how mathematicians think and create, William Byers uses the following concept of ambiguity: "Ambiguity involves a single situation or idea that is perceived in two self-consistent but mutually incompatible frames of reference" (6, p. 28).
Ambiguity involves a tension that drives creativity. How one lives and works with ambiguity is critically important not only in mathematics, but also and analogously in palliative care and its ethics (to be discussed briefly below). And how should one work with ambiguity? "The ambiguity is not resolved by designating one meaning or one point of view as correct and then suppressing the others. The ambiguity is 'resolved' by the creation of a larger meaning that contains the original meanings and reduces to them in special cases" (6, p. 77).
The nature of the electron in quantum physics offers an example of the need for two seemingly incompatible descriptions to capture the behaviour of this particle. In one frame of reference, the electron behaves as a particle. In another frame of reference, the electron behaves as a wave. Any attempt to declare one of these descriptions as correct and the other as false would lead to a collapse of this particle's complex reality. That com-plexity requires that both seemingly incompatible descriptions be held together in tension (6, p. 60-63) .
Are there situations in palliative care requiring the holding together in tension of two or more self-consistent, but seemingly incompatible, systems of thought and belief if we are to honour and not collapse the reality and complexity of these situations?
Ambiguity in Palliative Care?
The one central situation of palliative care, the situation of the dying, it would seem to me, exhibits all of the features of ambiguity introduced in the preceding paragraphs.
In this situation, we come rapidly to realize that other people act on moral convictions different from our own. We live in a postmodern world. We instinctively mistrust universal prescriptions proposed as applying to all people in all times and in all places. How, in such a world, can anyone seriously claim that there is fundamentally only one right, rational, and dignified way to die?
Some people want to live at all costs, even at the cost of enduring inadequately controllable pain, debilitating fatigue, and crushing anguish. They will fight death to the bitter end. Others will not resist or rebel against death, but await death's coming with quiet resignation. Still others will refuse steadfastly to accept their disintegration and will demand and exercise control over the timing of their death, as did Diane in the Dr. Quill New England Journal of Medicine story (7) when bone pain, weakness, fatigue, and fevers began to assume control of her life. The physicist Perry Bridgman didn't resignedly await death either. Sensitive to his essential isolation and his awful freedom, he wrapped up his work, wrote a note, and then killed himself. (8) And I also remember a young musician in advanced stages of AIDS, before the development of multiple life-prolonging medications. He really wanted to live, but knew he was facing the advancing onslaught of dementia. He chose to use his adequate supply of barbiturates to end his life before he lost his mind. Others, without the strength or resources to end their own prolonged dying, ask doctors to do this for them.
With this rapid survey of the diverse perceptions and moral convictions about the right ways to die, we arrive at the long-standing and continuing ambiguity encompassing euthanasia. The situation of the dying, and euthanasia in that situation, requires, I think, the holding together in tension of two self-consistent and incompatible systems of belief, thought, and action regarding human control over death. Does the continued criminalization of euthanasia equal the refusal to maintain this tension by affirming that only one of these two self-consistent systems is right and the other has to be wrong? Is this rejection of ambiguity equal to a rejection of the complexity of the human condition? Is there some higher viewpoint or more encompassing frame of reference that would support the holding together in tension of these two self-consistent but incompatible systems of belief and action? Prior to these questions, of course, we should not simply assume, but rather critically ask, whether each of these incompatible systems of belief and act regarding euthanasia really are self-consistent. And if they are not?
